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LESSONS FROM THE PAST?  








Summary: 1. Lessons from the past? – 2. The dreadful 20th century. – 3. 
Constitutional state. – 4. Return to a ‘constitutional state’. – 5. 
Europeanization. – 6. Globalisation 
 
1. Lessons from the past?  
Lessons from the past - this is a common expectation on Historians. 
Please tell us the lesson we can learn from the past! As experts for the past 
Historians like to comply with this request because they gain the aura to 
have the right of deciding not only about the past but also about the future. 
To start with a paradox: Historians have the same knowledge about the 
future as everybody else. They are neither Haruspices nor priests of Clio nor 
oracles. Historians describe the past as closely as possible based on a 
presumed truth. They interpret texts and pictures of the past. But there is 
no way of determining normative directives for the future based on this 
descriptive hermeneutic work. The future is the most unknown. It contains 
more surprises than we can imagine. In short: it is not possible to define the 
future out of the past. 
At the same time we know, especially from the education of children, that 
the only way of learning is based on (your own/or other) experiences. 
Humans are able to handle discursively their gained experiences regarding 
the organisation of decisive and protective legal and institutional structures. 
There is no way back, but a way forward, into the future, is only possible 
with the aid of experiences gained in the past1. 
 
1 Stolleis, 2016a. 
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Therefore let’s reduce the demand to teach lessons of the past of some 
Historians (Philosophers, Theologians) to a realistic and moderate level. As 
jurists, how can we learn from historical experiences of the 20th century? 
 
2. The dreadful 20th century 
Especially in Europe, the 20th century was a century of horror. In Western 
Europe, the belief in liberal self-monitoring collapsed after the experiences 
of the social question and the industrial capitalism2. Authoritarian, half and 
full-fascistic regimes came to be omnipresent everywhere (Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Greece, Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and of course in 
Germany after 1933). Almost without transition the Tsarist Russian Empire 
turned into the socialistic force of Lenin and Stalin3. The small states, which 
were hardly able to liberally organise themselves, were annexed by the 
Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria) 
and again oppressed. In the Balkans there was the Tito-Regime and the 
primal communistic state of Albania4. 
In the second half of the 20th century most of the states turned back to 
democratic-parliamentary regimes, such as Italy and Germany, Austria, 
Greece, with a short period of Colonels’ regime, Spain and Portugal, and at 
the end the states which gained their freedom after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. 
Altogether it was a permanent shift in terms of oppression and freedom 
as well as absence and presence of rights. I have to remind you of this and 
choose intentionally the German example. After the setting of the star of 
liberalism and practising the presidential dictatorship between 1930 and 
1932, Hitler, the most radical opponent of liberalism, parliamentarianism 
and constitutional state came to power. Immediately regime opponents 
were arrested and deported, citizenships were denationalised, properties 
confiscated, civil service laws deprived; followed by public arsons, 
abasements, ostracism in any way, until the “extermination of European 
Jews” – the “holocaust” or the “shoa” started under the veil of war. Millions 
of victims were rounded up, stored in a stock car and killed. These tortures 
 
2 Stolleis, 2014a.  
3 Hildermeier, 1998; with perspective on cultural history Schlögel, 2017.  
4 Calic, 2016.  
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are well-known throughout the world today. Memorials, Holocaust 
museums, countless books and films are spread over the world. The brilliant 
illustrator and Pulitzer Prize winner Art Spiegelmann drew affectingly a 
comic about this topic (Maus: A Survivor’s Tale, 1980-1991). 
Today, we can have a look at the 20th century with different eyes, more 
unbiased than in 1945, and therefore also consider its communistic aspect. 
It caused millions of victims as well, even if we don’t believe Stéphane 
Courtois, who assumed a number of 100 million victims caused by 
communist regimes in his book “The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, 
Terror, Repression” in 1997. Today, nobody contradicts that there were a 
myriad of victims. 
The idea is not the double-entry bookkeeping of terror – fascistic and 
communistic. This attempt would be pointless and leads to never-ending 
debates about ideologies and guilt. The difference between the death of 
starvation in Stalinism and the quasi-industrial-killings of the Holocaust 
cannot be divided into categories like ‘inevitable’ on the one hand, and 
‘absurd’ on the other. Hecatombs of victims are always ‘absurd’. For the 
purpose of this lecture it is enough to assert that the 20th century was the 
most murderous one in the whole human history. In absolute terms the 
number of the dead exceeds every hitherto existing memories. But also 
relating to the relative number of a growing world population the death rate 
seems to be extremely high, presumably because it was the first time of 
mass and “mechanical” killing. Death became an industrial product. Adding 
the infinite suffering of relatives, refugees, dispossessed, disenfranchised 
and expropriated, the defamed and camp-vegetating people, every person 
disentitled of his remedy to the death – all this exceeds our conception. 
 
3. Constitutional state 
Let’s focus now on the counter concept of civilization, the constitutional 
state. It emerged from the ideals of the American and the French Revolution 
in the 18th century. Its typical structures, which were developed in the 19th 
century, are as follows: Monopoly on the use of force of the state and 
functional balance of power, commitment of the state to the precise 
requirements of democratic law, legal control by independent law courts, 
penetration of the whole legal system by the postulates of constitutions, 
especially basic rights. 
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This is set as the permanent European model, however it still includes rich 
variety. In Germany the term ‘Rechtsstaat’ first emerged in 18005. Other 
European languages adopted it (état de droit, stato di diritto, estado de 
derecho, estado de direito). The American doctrine of ‘government of law’ 
(and not men) became the maxim of every European state. First of all, it was 
positioned against the despotism of the monarch, against the dogma of his 
sovereignty. But in the course of the 19th century the European 
conservatives (mostly even the monarchists) started to accept and support 
the program. The constitutional state was at the same time connoted with 
the forward-looking progress of trade and industry because it ensured the 
calculability of risks and security of the remedy. Thus the ideals of personal 
and economic freedom were connected with the desire for internal and 
external state protection. 
We are all aware that the European way to a constitutional state, for 
binding the state on its law and constitution, took overall approximately 200 
years. The road was full of setbacks and, of course, full of human sacrifices. 
We should be remembering the length of this road while criticizing the lack 
of respect of human rights in post-dictatorship regimes, in the Islamic world 
or in the formerly Soviet-occupied states. As observing historians we have 
to call on to be patient. Of course that will not help the victims of the current 
conflicts. 
 
4. Return to a ‘constitutional state’ 
If we want to understand why there were significant differences in the 
return to a constitutional state, an independent legal system and the 
enforcement of basic laws, we have to take a look back in the past and ask: 
Why was it so simple to break the juridical, ethical, cultural or civil 
stoppages? Why were many autocratic or dictatorial regimes able to defy 
the rights?  
For appreciation, we have to identify the similarities and differences in a 
more specific way: 
(a) Similarities of the different fascist regimes in Western Europe and the 
socialistic regimes of the Soviet Union were revolutionary establishments 
and ideological bases. They wanted to form, educate and lead a new society 
 
5 Stolleis, 1990; Id., 2014b. 
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based on a new spirit by all available means, even if it includes violence or 
killing against their real or assumed opponents. The civic idea of the 
constitutional state did not fit into their anti-bourgeois and anti-liberal 
approaches. Mistrust against the state meant also mistrusting the leading 
party. A legally guaranteed remedy against the state and its leading party 
was a way of resistance to the party and their leaders. They did not want a 
‘legal’ opposition. But to be consisting, almost every kind of a constitutional 
state was disposed – at first the constitutional court. Later on also the 
administrative courts were marginalized. Independent courts were replaced 
by politicized courts who had the purpose to destroy the inner opposition. 
Those tribunals were named significantly ‘Volksgerichte’ or 
‘Volksgerichtshöfe’ (People’s courts). This should imply that the populace 
judge over their opponents without any extensive formalities. 
The destruction of the constitutional state in the Soviet Union after 1917 
proceeded rapidly and without much difficulty6. There were no pre-existing 
structures formed by a bourgeois revolution or struggles for constitution. 
Traditions of fundamental rights or an independent legal system didn’t exist. 
The legal form, which had been implemented by Alexander II since 1864, 
was buried with military and intelligence repression by his followers 
Alexander III and Nicolaus II. Neither the Russian Revolution in 1905-1907 
nor the October Revolution in 1917 led, as everybody knows, into a 
constitutional state. Quite the contrary: Under Lenin and especially under 
the somehow paranoid-mistrusting Stalin the penal camps had been stoked 
up again. There is a direct path from Dostoyevsky’s ‘The House of the Dead’ 
(1860) to Solzhenitsyn’s ‘The Gulag Archipelago’ (1973) – the camps for 
contra-revolutionaries and class enemies. 
In other words: in Western understanding, Russia never developed a 
constitutional state. The state and the Russian Orthodox Church acted in 
traditional and incorporated-authoritarian ways. Though the Russian legal 
education of the 19th century had many interfaces with the West, for 
instance in Dorpat/Tartu, at the ‘Kaiserliche Rechtsschule’ (Imperial Law 
School) in Saint Petersburg or in Kharkiv, Ukraine7, the group of lawyers 
trained within this framework wasn’t huge enough to stand up against the 
 
6 Baberowski, 2017.  
7 Silnizki, 1997.  
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authoritarian regime – before and after 1917. The approaches of a self-
contained Marxian-Soviet legal-theory (Stuck, Paschukanis), were liquidised 
by Stalin. In the end Andrey Vyshinsky (1883-1954) is at the same level with 
the German Roland Freisler, of whom Hitler once said he would be a 
Bolshevik ‘in his whole ability’. 
Some comments – in this ‘socialistic’ context – on the German 
Democratic Republic in Eastern Germany: The German Democratic Republic 
was, at least until 1961, a vassal state of the Soviet Union and undoubtedly 
not a constitutional state. It seems appropriate to differentiate three stages 
in the history of the German Democratic Republic: Firstly, the years of 
occupation under the ‘guardianship’ of the Soviet Military Administration, 
secondly, the Stalinist-epoch under Ulbricht and thirdly, the Honecker-era. 
A time of brutal injustice and national uprising until 1953 was followed by a 
consolidated sovereignty of the SED – characterised by a steady growth of 
omnipresent spying and prohibition of fundamental rights of freedom. 
Nothing changed in this concept, apart from certain liberalisation after 1961 
and 1985. Concept and praxis of the state were diametrically opposed to a 
constitutional state. Both: concerning the appointment of the legal system 
in general and the missing administration law in special8. The injustice was 
bureaucratized: through omnipresent ‘Staatssicherheit’ (state security) and 
arbitrariness in the offices. The repression became ideologically funded in 
terms of ‘education’: An education which should lead to the new socialist 
human being. Finally the regime collapsed for economic and foreign policy 
reasons, but in general, because of the loss of legitimacy. Those evident lacks 
of the constitutional state played an important role. 
(b) The situation in the Western countries was quite different. The first 
half of the 20th century was dominated by fascistic or national-socialistic 
regimes. They already had a century-long tradition of indigenous and Roman 
law and a large number of lawyers who were trained in those frameworks at 
classical universities. The features of a stable constitutional state tradition 
in every country, Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, were similar, just 
a little differently nuanced. Here, the farewell from the bourgeois 
constitutional state took different, partially bizarre, shapes. 
 
8 Hoeck, 2003; Stolleis, 2009.  
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The new dictatorial powers stepped carefully forward to ascertain 
whether the civil jurists-elite is willing to follow the new line. Mussolini built 
his fascistic institution besides the monarchy as a Dual state. Likewise Franco 
pursued an authoritarian-conservative line in Spain, based on the military 
and the ‘nacional-catolicísmo’, after a first phase of bloody payoff with the 
‘Movimiento Nacional’9. There was no constitution, just a few ‘fundamental 
rights’ and finally the return to Monarchy. The short-lived austro-fascim 
(1934-1938) was also no renunciation from the previous way with its 
disposition of authoritarian, federal structures, but rather an exchange of 
some leading heads while the legal system continued to work10. In Hitler-
Germany at first, there was the open break of law, but later on, after the 
killing of some people11, an announcement of Hitler that the revolution is 
over and a return to regular and established rules possible. They pretended 
to be civilised, the middle classes breathed a sigh of relief and additionally 
they also benefited from the deportation of the Jews. The bourgeois 
lawyers, in the vast majority with a German-nationalistic way of thinking, no 
fanatic, but rather moderate national-socialists, did not want the 
destruction of the legal forms, no disorder. Just after 1938/39 a new period 
of unlawfulness was onset and led into the extermination of the European 
Jewry, accompanied by the killings of other minorities. Until the end of the 
regime a parallelism of normality and terror existed. This belonged to the 
signum of National Socialism12. 
(c) The end of World War II indicated the European signal of a return to a 
constitutional state. The resistance circles already demanded: immediate 
return to a constitutional state. The same also applies to Italy after Mussolini 
and France after the Régime de Vichy. Switzerland and Great Britain just had 
to cancel a few restrictions which had been established during the war13. 
 
9 For an detailed conception on this see Fernández-Crehuet López –Hespanha (edd.), 
2008.  
10 Tálos, 2013; Tálos – Neugebauer (edd.), 2014.  
11 Bloch, 1970.  
12 See Stolleis, 2010; Id., 2016b. 
13 Kley, 2015, §§ 15,16.  
MICHAEL STOLLEIS 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Italian Review of Legal History, 4 (2018), n. 09, pag. 1-19. 
Registrazione presso il Tribunale di Milano n. 227/2015 
Contatti: via Festa del Perdono 7 - 20122 Milano - segreteria.irlh@unimi.it  8 
The authoritarian regimes in Spain and Portugal remained in power. Eastern 
Europe was drowned in Stalinism. 
The collective extension of European institutions played an important 
role in the process of a return to a constitutional state in Western Europe. It 
was a return to the constitutional fundaments of Europe, to democratic 
decision-making, to the principles of separation of powers, the recognition 
of human rights as well as juridical control of the state14. The trauma of war 
brought the nations together, an exchange of youth was established and 
Historians started to research on the causes of the catastrophe and were 
employed over decades. 
In the past 30 years we can observe a return to constitutional states all 
over Europe, a return to superior juridical control, which attend to 
constitutional conformism of the institutions. It is, indeed, a highly 
politicized control but was proved as an important corrective of the political 
everyday life. The constitutional jurisdiction appears to be a fundamental 
constructional element of a liberal and democratic order, acting in a free 
society, manned with independent magistrates, exposed to the control of 
science. Especially in Britain and France the fact that also acts of the 
legislative are controlled, led to practical and theoretical problems. But in 
federal structured Germany it is accepted because of the always-been 




The previously shown model of a democratic constitutional state, as it 
developed from the struggles of the 19th, the two world wars of the 20th 
century and Europe’s burden of dictatorship does not mean “the end of 
history” at all. Not only Europe, which emancipated from fascistic and 
communistic repression, mostly during the last generations, is thrown into a 
new context of world-politics. But also the old states of Asia, the postcolonial 
states of Africa which live in particularly harsh conditions and the 
democracies and dictatorships of South America – everybody needs 
reorientation in a rapidly changing world. 
 
14 For France see Gaillet, 2012.  
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(a) But let’s start with Europe: We have been facing a new era of 
institutional consolidation with the Maastricht Treaty, which was enacted in 
1992 and became effective in 1993. At that time, there was a geographical 
expansion (Austria, Sweden, Finland), the internal frontiers were eliminated, 
and the Euro became the new European currency in 1999. Since 2002 it is 
the official currency of twelve countries. On this symbolic and psychological 
active innovation are many tries regarding a real European constitution, 
including a charter of fundamental rights – despite the fact that there was 
and is neither a European nation nor real European parties nor a 
homogeneous public opinion nor a common language. The process of 
Constitutionalization of Europe developed constantly, despite many 
objections, even if it temporary happened against the majority, in the case 
of France, the Netherlands or Ireland15. 
The century-lasting process of European integration almost deregulated 
the traditional borders of the national state, finally with the ‘Schengen-
Agreement’. Not just the tollgates and custom facilities disappeared even 
the goods traffic circulates without restrictions as well as the exchange of 
services and information. In the light of transnational freedom of movement 
questions of residence and workplace seem to be secondarily. People also 
vote for a European Parliament, still less interesting than the national 
elections, but the constantly growing competences of the European 
Parliament will change its role based on long-term considerations. 
Additionally people get informed by mass media about the importance and 
the influence of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg as well as the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. In other words: The people, 
in any case those of the older member states, know more or less that they 
are inevitably part of Europe and that they have to participate in the 
European development process in their own interest. A European public, a 
European identity slowly comes into being. 
Right in the middle of the integration process the Eastern Bloc collapsed. 
Withstanding this, many new challenges arose for Europe. The Cold War 
ended officially with the Helsinki Accords in Paris in November 1990. The 
Baltic states were set up to the Balkan new governments, they searched for 
access to the European market and many of them adopted the European 
 
15 Schorkopf, 2015. For the consequences on Germany see Mangold, 2011.  
MICHAEL STOLLEIS 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Italian Review of Legal History, 4 (2018), n. 09, pag. 1-19. 
Registrazione presso il Tribunale di Milano n. 227/2015 
Contatti: via Festa del Perdono 7 - 20122 Milano - segreteria.irlh@unimi.it  10 
currency. While using the debility of post Soviet Union to change position – 
from Warsaw Pact to NATO – the states of Eastern Europe build the 
fundament for a new juridical and constitutional order. These revolutions 
themselves, from the Baltic States to South East Europe, would have been 
big political challenges. But the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991 led into war 
and mass murders and concurrently into a NATO operation, especially in 
Kosovo in 1999, not to forget the tragedy around Sarajevo.  
These European and geopolitical actions are well known, especially the 
break of 9/11. Since then this “nine/eleven” symbolizes the manifold 
tensions in the Middle East (Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Yemen) between 
the Western and the Islamic World. Since 2010, there were popular uprisings 
in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria, but also in Morocco, Algeria and Jordan. 
The bisectional constitution of global order which provided the coordination 
system for policy since World War II no longer exists. China has risen up, USA 
is geared to the Pacific and now restricted to national egoism, the Russian 
Empire is diminished, today it is only Russia and a chaplet of small states 
around it, which followed the path of independence, sometimes with many 
difficulties, and it is still a far cry from democratic structures. Belarus is just 
one example, although a tough one.  
This is the framework for constitutionalisation in context of globalisation. 
Those facts are immediately relevant for Europe. What happens in North 
Africa and the Middle East doesn’t affect the European Union, but the 
political and military decisions of Teheran, Damascus, Cairo or Jerusalem do. 
(b) But let’s first take a look on the inner difficulties of Europe. From the 
perspective of the citizens the institutions in Brussels, Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg are far away and alien. What happens there is indeed 
appreciable – prices, production, competition, employment market, 
announcements and so on – but seems to be abscond from the democratic 
instruments like votes or self-organization of people. The financial crisis and 
the turbulences around the currency Euro were experienced as particularly 
dramatic and risky. To some it appeared as the total loss of national 
sovereignty, as expropriation and prohibition. Others bristle at funding 
national shortfalls while thinking that they could have been avoided by 
having a consequent policy. In the past, those states had the option to fund 
their shortfalls by currency devaluation. While being a part of the European 
Union this is not possible anymore. The Details could be set aside here; but 
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everybody knows that anti-European Nationalists and Populists rise up. The 
process of European integration which has always been in a “stop and go” 
circle attained at ‘stop’ at the moment. Every kind of integration, for 
example the initiative for creating a central budget controlling, is 
controversial, especially in time of Brexit-deliberations. Let us not prevail in 
any illusions: The situation is very difficult. It is the first time after 1957 that 
we are talking seriously about the end of the ‘European Project’ – an end, 
which is by realistic political means not ‘allowed’. 
(c) Thereby the process of constitutionalisation ceases even on a 
European level. To revive him, we have to simplify the multitude of ‘levels’. 
Inherently the national states themselves have a complex structure, 
especially the federal-structured ones. Nowadays we have the European 
institutions positioned above. We can speak of a European multi-level-
normativity. It is pretty uncertain, if there will be a proceeding 
constitutionalisation in direction to the ‘United States of Europe’, a long-
lasting stagnancy or even a deflection of competences back to national 
states. The history of the European agreement shows that, in any case, we 
can’t speak about a ‘natural-like’ development leading into a European 
federal state. However, supposedly geopolitical conditions will push us in 
those directions, if Europe wants to preserve the position of high economic-
standard and wants to keep political influence alive. Somewhere in between 
of regulatory overkill and delegitimisation we have to find a way. It will be a 
generational duty to approximate the complex reality with the normative 
idealism of European constitutionalism – only in the states of Western 
Europe. 
If we take a look, not only at Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg, but 
at the new member states in Eastern Europe as well, then the gap between 
normativity and reality becomes apparent. Rumania and Bulgaria are states 
with a weak economy, highly levelled unemployment and corruption; also 
the western standards of a constitutional and social state are not achieved. 
The universities work under difficult conditions. Profiled national juridical 
culture is not visibly existing. European Law does not count – or just with 
attenuation. Law enforcement is still suboptimal. This retroacts to the 
European Law and needs to be included as exceptional rules or transitional 
periods in the Western states of Europe; because we have to deal with the 
outsourcing of employment to those regions. In other words: The 
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enlargement of the European Union to the East and South East was 
geopolitical necessary and correct, but the accomplishment of the thereby 
accrued economic and juridical problems is a decade-lasting challenge. 
6. Globalisation 
(a) The process of globalisation comes along with the internal and 
external problems of constitutionalisation of Europe. What is meant by 
‘globalisation’ remains vague and it is also questionable whether everything 
is as new as it appears.  
The ‘first globalisation’ was the Spanish-Portuguese discovery of the new 
world and the first circumnavigation in the 15th and 16th century. Equally 
important was the Copernican Revolution. Since then the earth was a 
globular planet which circulates around the sun. 
The ‘second globalisation’ began with the industrial revolution in the 18th 
and 19th century. Now we speak about ‘world-literature’ (Goethe), ‘world-
trade’, ‘world-expositions’ (1851). The term, ‘world war’ was actually first 
mentioned in 1845. The competition for inventions and industrial 
production started. That was the time of ‘progress’ and ‘comparison’ itself. 
Karl Marx wrote in 1867: “The industrial developed nation just shows the 
future to the less developed nations”. The nations were measured on world-
scale. Even the new subject of Comparative Law was intentionally a ‘world-
subject’. International Law and Comparative Law, while becoming essential, 
attended the globalisation process. Since the 20th century, the dynamics of 
globalisation determined all elaborated and nascent industrial states. 
Factual borders only existed where technical infrastructure is 
underdeveloped or dictatorships build up their regimes on exclusion. 
With the revolutionary technical development of aerospace, new ‘spaces’ 
and constraints for Law emerged. We observe a process of erosion of 
national boundaries and a tendency to placelessness (Atopia)16. Everything 
can be observed, photographed or saved. News, stock exchange prices, 
capital, services of all kinds are exchanged. Spaces seem to become much 
smaller or lose its relevance. The time to override space is shrinking 
constantly. It is impossible to predict the effects on the normative orders of 
historically grown societies. The institutional arrangement, namely state and 
administration, will change dramatically. Erosion of boundaries makes sure 
 
16 Willke, 2001; Teubner, 1997. 
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that the territorial base of state loses its relevance. Even war becomes 
placelessness; there are covered strikes and unmanned weapon systems. 
Less bellicose examples are the non-governmental basic rules of world 
trade, electronic communication, stock exchange and monetary transaction, 
mass spectacles of sports (soccer, tennis, alpine skiing, motor racing), 
including the Olympic Games.  
In addition, there are norms produced by many nongovernmental or 
arbitral courts. Those corpora of regulation consist of ‘Law’ – provided that 
the term ‘Law’ is here differentiated from the attribute ‘State’. They are 
allowed to impose sanctions. They are emerging, in a way, on the basis of 
private autonomy and are pushed by the practical constraints of global 
exchange. Legislators are those who have strong institutional and economic 
resources and a vital interest in binding themselves and apprentices to their 
corpus of regulation – not least because of reducing overheads. 
(b) Putting all together, the question occurs whether there is a possibility 
of transformation from the classical international law to a new ‘constitutional’ 
world order. This issue affects especially the lawyers of national constitutional 
law. In some ways they could use the conceptions of Kelsen, especially the 
idea of universality of legal norms and the idea of the possibility of a discourse 
about universal ethics. The demands are clear: The different legal cultures 
should come to an agreement! The European-American side should ‘open up’ 
to the factual differences and compromise, while the non-European, 
especially the Islamic, side should on their part approximate the universal 
ethics. The ideological and practical problems are clear, too: In philosophy, 
there is the Habermas-orientated Recognition Theory which tries to evolve a 
model of ‘transnational justice and democracy’ and which discusses universal 
ethics. Conflict- and Peace-studies, Philosophy of Law and Social-Theory are 
working in many ways on the fields of International Law, defy it, and 
sometimes their idealism seems to be too extensive. For example in 
demanding public participation in international conflicts or privatisation of 
security policy. ‘Global justice’, so they say, should be established, not by 
military interventions or economic sanctions, but by arrangements of actors 
– so at least by self-produced Law17. 
 
17 See the summary in Stolleis, 2017.  
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(c) The idealistic or rationalistic idea of constitutionalised global politics is 
opposed by the observation of a factual fragmentation of International Law. 
There are actually some indications for this purpose. The world, brought 
together by communication, becomes even more complex instead of being 
simple. Subsystems have to be developed constantly to limit the risk of 
conflicts. New normative orders are formed in every subsystem. But they 
have to be compatible with the functional differentiation. The conflicts of 
those normative orders have to be absorbed by new conflict rules again. 
Regardless whether it is described in terms of system theory or culture-
critical as a symptom of decline of classical international law, or somehow 
as a kind of ‘primeval soup’ of a (web-based) deliberation, from where new 
normative orders or new hegemonies are emerging, but one fact is 
incontestable: international law takes new shapes in context of 
globalisation. If the thesis of the drifting-apart of culture areas (Western, 
Far-East, Islamic Spheres) comes true, it would result in the regionalisation 
of International Law – with even more incalculable effects on the 
implementation of universal human right standards. Unfortunately the 
voices, which are talking about the universal claim of Western International 
Law as a new sophisticated kind of colonialism, increase. On the other hand 
they warn of abandoning the universal claim and accepting the 
differentiation in culture areas because such a development would directly 
rip into the heart of International Law, edified with a universal claim since 
antiquity. 
A conservation of the universal claim of International Law is not hopeless, 
if we try to use all elements which could be useful for the creation of a 
peaceful and liberal order. For example: the cooperation of national 
governments for implementation of aid programs or external support of free 
elections. Where state structures have been destroyed in civil war, 
international law requests could be at a pinch advanced with aid of NGO’s 
or economy. 
Times of closed nation states and ‘classical’ International Law, which was 
practiced up to World War I., are over. The number of actors had increased; 
religious and cultural coined regions became apparent. Alike the differences 
of state-structured public law, international law and private law are 
diffusing. In face of the deficient international security, caused by the 
increase of terrorism as well as further dispersion of nuclear weapons, a 
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modified transformation of the constitutional principles seems to be a 
realistic challenge. It already happened that the principles of the American 
and the French Revolution jumped over the frames of national constitutions; 
they already became a part of international law. Principles of a 
constitutional state (right to due process, publicity, neither arbitrary nor 
doubled penalty), division of powers, strict obligation to statue and law are 
part of international law, even though in a modified form. All those had 
already been proved on national level. Although these elements are rooted 
in the European-American constitutional debate of the 18th century, they are 
also universally applicable in the context of globalisation. 
(d) However, this modest premise of dissolving bindings raises a problem 
– because the theoretical fundament of the mentioned principles is unclear. 
We cannot rely any longer on the classical Natural law, which was cultivated 
from antiquity to 18th century. Apart from the catholic social theory there is 
no publicity left. At best we can speak of a ‘crypto natural justice’ circulating 
in those debates. By the way, a more and more positivistic international law 
took its place, in terms of international conventions and even partly in 
codifications, especially in humanitarian areas. At the same time almost 
every state became a part of the ‘international community’. All emerging 
states were included into globalised International Law. Secessions make 
sure that the number constantly grows. The United Nations Organisation 
stands symbolically for this development. 
At the same time we observe an individualisation of international law; for 
example in the fight against slavery and human trafficking, minority rights 
and others. Mainly the universal phrasing of human rights provides the 
rhetorical character of a world constitution of international law. Although 
international law was still an ‘inter’ – national law, new actors appeared, 
NGO’s, arbitral courts, the European Union, the World Trade Union – 
everybody is shaping norms. 
(e) In this way the borders of the state become diffuse but permeable. 
Private autonomy constitutes normative global networks. In one way we 
could interpret this as an increase of democratic participation. But the 
counter question: “how much freedom and remedy is going to be destroyed 
at the same time” is still open. If there is no authoritative normativity, the 
poor people will lose the game. Global networks have more influence than 
the individuals or the unorganized people and they will use it to assert 
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themselves. So at the end strong procedural structures don’t exist, as well 
as democratic identification. The ‘global players’ are as egoistic as anti-
democratic regimes. Both refuse participation. 
(f) The decline of the significance of the national state will have serious 
consequences. It retains its oldest task – to take care of security – but it has 
to handle it differently. For example: There are no classical wars left. 
Nowadays, war is concealed, sophisticated and asymmetric. The conflicts 
are regional, fragmented: collective strategic foreign missions, unmanned 
weaponry and cyber-war are on the agenda. An international law, 
responding on these developments, arises. Warring politicians underlie 
international criminal law. And above this it has to challenge the task of 
‘civilizing’ the new forms of war. As a consequence individualisation of 
international law will go on. 
In parallel with this the role of the state is shifting with regard to the inner 
concerns, too. The national state becomes the communal or regional ‘state’ 
which is responsible for accomplishments and deficits. Education and 
welfare policy will remain as ‘core business’, even though nongovernmental 
and transnational law is spreading and society will regulate itself more 
strongly again. 
As a matter of fact the constitutional state has to absorb the risks arising 
in the context of globalisation, namely if the citizens are confronted with 
private legal persons and not with ‘the’ state. Today we talk of regulated 
self-regulation. The variable mixture of self-regulation and surveillance 
seems to connect the particular benefits, which arises from the actions of 
private individuals on the one hand and with the state one’s on the other. 
The state gives incentives for the deployment of liberties. But this 
deployment has to be kept in the frame of the ‘ordre public’. 
It is even more important to relocate the state functions to the outside. 
The static idea of people is replaced by a ‘drifting’ population including 
immigrants, political and economic refugees, alongside the national state 
other institutions come into responsibility – the institutions of the European 
Union, those, who are constituted by international law, nongovernmental 
organisations, global enterprises and especially networks like Google. Those 
do not threat the leading position of the national state aggressively. But 
subtle changes can be observed. They depend on social practices: the 
collection of images (‘street view’), of documents and dynamic data (real-
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time tracking of mobile phones) or by publication of secret documents 
(‘Wikileaks’). There is no exclusive right of the national state to handle the 
matters of concern in his territory. 
We have to think about the future and the constitutional state in our 
world society. Constitutional Law, the complex of Law, has to face the 
challenge of globalisation. For more than two decades we register the 
changes and it is common to speak of an ‘open state’. This ensures that the 
state is still the reference figure even in times of manifold cooperation and 
complexity. It will be important to find a balance between the local, regional, 
national and transnational shere. This balance, which is per se tenuous, is 
the object of all juridical disciplines, from private to international law. But 
the legitimation of the modern state is not only dependent on its 
competency to take care of the individual rights. It has to civilize the 
institutions which try to replace it by the process of globalisation. That is why 
we have to establish more transparency and controls to the global-acting 
enterprises. Besides, we should transfer democratic practices from the 
national to the supranational level. 
The past teaches us that such a conversion lasts many generations. 
Institutions and mentalities just change very slowly. There will be a lot of 
passages and, of course, some experiments will fail. With a science-critical 
intention we have to be doubtful about those concepts of a ‘virtual state’, 
an ‘electronic democracy’, a ‘global civilisation’, or a ‘cosmopolitan 
democracy’. But it is interesting to take a look on them as symptoms of the 
social change itself. There are two ways to gain knowledge. On one side we 
can use the classics for interpreting the unknowingly present. On the other 
side we can try to produce empirical material to understand who we are. 
But: We are always signed by our past – naturally. Today globalisation, and 
what is associated with it, gives us the strongest impulses for intellectual 
fantasies. But in a global society every person has to realize – voluntarily or 
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